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The phenomenon of tipping service providers is seen to present a conundrum for 
standard economic theory.  Economists presume that individuals act in their economic 
self-interest.  Thus, individuals engage in transactions with one another when it is in both 
their economic self-interests to do so.  But it is hard to see how tipping is in the tipper’s 
self-interest.
1  Tipping is a mere custom; it is not ordinarily required by any contractual 
obligation, express or otherwise.  Moreover, one generally tips only after the services for 
which the tip is offered have been fully delivered.  
One might think that repeat customers of the same service provider tip in order to 
ensure proper service the next time—i.e., they actually tip in advance for services to be 
rendered in the future.  But studies show that individuals tip service providers even if it is 
a virtual certainty that they will never seek service from that service provider ever again.
2
Some  commentators  have  suggested  that  tipping  allows  customers  to  monitor 
directly service providers.
3  This achieves two goals.  First, it creates an incentive for 
service providers to provide quality service.
4  Second, it allows for monitoring of service 
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1 Ofer H. Azar, The Implications of Tipping for Economics and Management, 30 INT’L J. SOC. ECON. 1084, 
1087 (2003) (“Tipping is a challenge to standard economic modeling.  Why do consumers leave money to 
strangers when they are not legally obligated to do so and do not derive a material benefit from it?”).
2 Saul Levmore explains:
Rational choice adherents are somewhat puzzled by the tipping custom, as they are by many other 
norms, especially when practiced by non-repeat players.  A one-time customer would seem to gain 
very little by making a gratuitous payment.  The mystery is why the practice persists or why it has 
not moved up chronologically to precede the provision of service.
Saul Levmore, Norms as Supplements, 86 VA. L. REV. 1989, 1991 (2000) [hereinafter Levmore, Norms as 
Supplements]  (footnote  omitted);  see  Russell  B.  Korobkin  &  Thomas  S.  Ulen,  Law  and  Behavioral 
Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1128 
(2000) (echoing this concern).
3 See generally Ofer H. Azar, Optimal Monitoring with External Incentives: The Case of Tipping, 70 S. 
ECON. J. (forthcoming 2004) (exploring the interplay between tipping and monitoring).  
4 Levmore argues that a tipping norm is most likely to be useful to encourage—and is therefore most likely 
to arise in the setting of—customized personal service.  See Saul Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts in 
Agency Arrangements: Lawyers, Real Estate Brokers, Underwriters, and Other Agents’ Rewards, 36 J.L. & 
ECON. 503, 533 n.55 (1993) [hereinafter Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts] (noting that, with respect to 
the question of where tipping customs evolve, “[o]ne fairly successful theory is that tipping is correlated 
with customized rather than with uniform service”).  “Thus,” explains Levmore, “waiters (who fill water 
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providers (and the accompanying incentive to provide good service) at lower cost than it 
would if employers had to monitor directly their service-providing employees.
5
But there are problems with this explanation for tipping as well.  First, because 
tipping is not required as any sort of contractual obligation and the tip is not provided 
until service has been rendered, it is unclear why service providers should rely on tips 
being provided.  And, as elucidated above, it is even more unclear where the customers 
are  not  repeat  customers.
6    Second,  empirical  studies  have  shown  that,  while  service 
quality is one factor that determines tip size, in reality many other factors—most of them 
unrelated to service quality—affect tip size.
7  Thus, the extent to which tipping in general 
creates an incentive for service providers to provide marginally better service is unclear.
8
At  the  other  extreme,  if  tipping  does  incentivize  service  providers  to  provide  better 
glasses and provide other customized services), porters, cab drivers (who exercise great control over routes 
and speed), and hair cutters are often tipped while bus drivers, fast-food cashiers, and flight attendants, who 
provide less customized services, are not customarily tipped.”  Id.  One might consider how the recent 
proliferation of “tip cans” for workers at cafeteria-style eateries like Starbucks and Subway fits into this 
model.
In more recent work, Levmore seems to afford the “customized service” argument less weight, 
explaining: “While tipping surely has something to do with individualized service, it may be more useful to 
emphasize the presence of tipping where there is no danger of destructive competition among those who 
are served.”  Levmore, Norms as Supplements, supra note [check], at 1995.  Moreover, Levmore observes 
that, even where customized services may be provided, tipping will generally not inhere where the owner 
himself or herself provides those services, see Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts, supra note [check], at 
533 n.55; supra [check], or “where the customer already pays the provider by the hour,” Levmore, Norms 
as Supplements, supra note [check], at 1996 (although Levmore suggests that the last variable “may simply 
camouflage  the  question  of  whether  the  customer  is  especially  well  situated  to  help  determine  the 
provider’s compensation,” id.).
5 Michael Conlin, Michael Lynn, and Ted O’Donoghue characterize the norm as a proxy for what would be 
a costly explicit service contract between consumers and service provider.  See Michael Conlin, Michael 
Lynn & Ted O’Donoghue, The Norm of Restaurant Tipping, 52 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR  ORG. 297, 304-05 
(2003).  Saul Levmore argues that the tipping norm is a socially valuable supplement to the employment 
contract between service providers and their employers.  See Levmore, Norms as Supplements, supra note 
2, at 1991-92.
6 Levmore concedes this shortcoming in the explanation.  See Levmore, Norms as Supplements, supra note 
2, at 1992-93.  But, he argues, “these flaws must be compared to those which accompany a compensation 
scheme controlled by  the employer alone, and it  is certainly plausible that tipping improves upon the 
contract that the employer and [service provider] (or the regulatory authorities and these private parties) an 
arrange on their own.”  Id. at 1992.  
7 See Michael Lynn, Restaurant Tipping and Service Quality: A Tenuous Relationship, 42 CORNELL HOTEL 
& RESTAURANT ADMIN. Q. 14 (2001) [hereinafter Lynn, Restaurant Tipping]; Michael Lynn, Tip Levels 
and Service: An Update, Extension, and Reconciliation, 44 CORNELL HOTEL & RESTAURANT ADMIN. Q.
139 (2003) [hereinafter Lynn, Tip Levels and Service].  For specific examples, see Conlin et al., supra note 
4, at 303 (finding statistically significant empirical evidence that “percent tip decreases with bill size at a 
decreasing rate; percent tip increases with group size and consumption of alcohol; percent tip decreases 
with the age of the tipper; and percent tip is larger for individuals who frequent full-service restaurants 
more  often”  (footnote  omitted));  Rick  B.  van  Baaren,  Rob  W.  Holland,  Bregje  Steenaert  &  Ad  van
Knippenberg,  Mimicry  for  Money:  Behavioral  Consequences  of  Imitation,  39  J.  EXPERIMENTAL  SOC. 
PSYCH. 393 (2003) (describing study findings that restaurant customers will tend to tip more when servers 
verbally mimic their customers by repeating back customers’ orders after the customers have stated their 
orders).
8 See Lynn, Tip Levels and Service, supra note 3, at 148 (“Research on tipping makes it clear that . . . 
managers should not rely on tips to motivate good service.”).
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service, there is the risk of so-called destructive competitive tipping—i.e., that tipping 
will encourage service providers to provide service to higher tippers to the exclusion of 
lower tippers.
9  If that is true, then the efficiency gains that the manager might enjoy by 
virtue of reduced monitoring costs might be lost to destructive competitive tipping.
10
Other  commentators,  including  behavioral  law  and  economics  scholars,  have 
suggested that tipping can best be explained as a norm.  On this account, people tip either 
because they seek the social approval of others,
11 because they have internalized societal 
9  A  commercial  of  current  vintage  for  an  insurance  company  presents  an  example  of  destructive 
competitive tipping.  The commercial presents a short vignette of a waitress, Cheryl, serving customers in a 
restaurant.  The customers, eager for service, engage in a bidding war for Cheryl’s services by offering to 
increase the amount they will tip Cheryl.  The winning table of customers offers the highest bid and also 
offers to bus the table.  The commercial, for Progressive Insurance Company, concludes by identifying 
Cheryl as Progressive’s “kind of customer”, presumably because she takes the time to seek out the best deal 
available.  
Saul Levmore provides the following illustration, in the context of apartment building residents 
and a doorman:
A resident or tenant in a high-rise building might tip a doorman or other employee “because” the 
tenant observes the level of service better than the manager who pays the doorman’s base salary.  
Tipping might generate greater effort on the doorman’s part.  But there is a danger that in order to 
maximize  gratuities,  the  doorman  will  withhold  service  from  some  tenants  and  shift  effort  to 
others.    Tipping  might  simply  cause  the  provider  to  allocate  efforts  and  good  cheer  across 
residents, rather than to increase total effort.  If tipping generates competition among residents 
more than it does greater effort from the employee, then tenants might be better off with a no-
tipping norm.  This conclusion requires that we downplay the possibility that competitive tipping 
. . . is efficient simply if it works to allocate services to those who value it most highly.  The rough 
idea is that such a market would be imperfect because the doorman, or comparable provider, is 
able to manipulate relatively ill-informed buyers.
Levmore, Norms as Supplements, supra note 2, at 1994 (footnote omitted).  Levmore also suggests that 
owners and employers, too, might suffer by virtue of competition among customers for service.  See id. at 
1994 n.7.
10 Given the possible problem of competitive tipping, Levmore suggests that a tipping norm is more likely 
to establish itself in situations “where there is no danger of destructive competition among those who are 
served.  . . . In short, the collective action problem among those  who are served by a single provider 
reduces the efficiency of the tipping supplement and makes a positive theory more difficult.”  Id. at 1995 
(footnote omitted).  Levmore notes that the argument against tipping in the context of a single service 
provider is “the cousin” of an argument he elsewhere makes that “multiple principals served by a single 
agent (as in the case of most homeowners who employ a single real estate agent to sell their houses) will 
prefer fixed commissions that reduce the agent’s incentive to prefer one seller over another.”  Id. at 1995 
n.8 (citing Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts, supra note 3, at 507).
Conlin,  Lynn,  and  O’Donoghue  also  acknowledge  the  potential  for  destructive  competitive 
tipping, but give it less weight than does Levmore, at least in the context of restaurant service:
While  some  customers  certainly  behave  in  this  fashion,  we  suspect  this  issue  is  not  a  major 
concern for our analysis because customers rarely discuss potential tips with waitpeople prior to 
meals.  Of course, whether such competition is likely to occur may help to explain why tipping 
arises in some arenas (and countries) but not others.
Conlin et al., supra note 4, at 306.
11 See, e.g., Leo P. Crespi, The Implications of Tipping in America, 11 PUB. OPINION Q. 424, 429 (1947) 
(“[C]ustom, meaning primarily fear of social disapproval, is today the principal reason why people tip.  If 
the arguments are accepted, a large proportion of the tipper public, and certainly the largest proportion of 
tippees, are quite  wrong in their belief that the  main reason  for tipping  is  still the original  motive of 
incentive and reward for good service.”).  Russell Korobkin and Thomas Ulen elucidate: 
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norms and believe it would be “wrong” not to tip,
12 or some combination of the two.
13
But the norm justification fails to explain how such a specific norm as topping would 
evolve and persist.
In  this  paper,  we  advance  an  explanation  for  tipping  that  has  received  scant 
attention  from  commentators,  especially  economic  commentators:  Tipping  developed, 
and  continues  to  exist,  at  least  in  part  as  result  of  efforts  to  reduce  costs  in  certain 
industry by funneling money to service providers tax-free.  Our explanation offers what 
other economic commentators’ explanations have not: an economic explanation for an 
economic phenomenon.  
Our approach also differs from that of other commentators in another important 
way.  We focus on tipping from the laborer’s  perspective.   Tipping  also presents an 
economic conundrum, at first blush, from the point of view of laborers.  As a general 
matter, people prefer jobs that offer steady wages as compared to jobs that offer variable 
wages—especially, as is generally the case with jobs that feature tipping as an income 
On one account, people value not only the inherent qualities of actions that they might take but 
also  the  esteem,  or  social  approval  of  others.    Compliance  with  social  norms  earns  the  actor 
esteem, whereas violation of social norms costs her esteem.  In economic terms, social norms can 
be thought of as providing a subsidy (in the form of positive esteem) for some behaviors while 
imposing a tax (in the form of negative esteem) for others.
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 2, at 1129-30 (footnotes omitted).  Along these lines, “when we see a diner 
leave a tip in a restaurant to which [she] will never return, we might interpret her behavior as evidence that 
she fears the loss of esteem she would suffer should her friends and neighbors learn that she failed to tip her 
server.”  Id. at 1130.  Accord Azar, supra note 1, at 1088 (“[T]he reason[] for tipping is that tipping is a 
social norm and that disobeying the norm is associated with a disutility caused by feelings of unfairness and 
embarrassment.”).
12 Korobkin and Ulen explain:
A competing view posits that people obey social norms that are contrary to their direct 
interests because actors internalize the norms of their communities.  According to this view, the 
cost of violating social norms is not loss of esteem in the eyes of peers but guilt or shame for 
doing something the actor experiences as “wrong” (the benefit to be gained from compliance with 
social norms can be referred to as “pride”).  The costs of violating social norms are imposed not 
by society but by the violator himself.
Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 2, at 1130 (footnotes omitted).  Under this approach, “if a diner tips her 
server in a restaurant in a community in which she knows no one and which is many miles away from her 
hometown, we might suspect that internalization is the better behavioral explanation.”  Id.
13 Korobkin and Ulen explain: “In many cases, a social norm might derive its power from both the desire 
for social approval and from internalization.  That is, . . . a diner might leave the server a tip because [she] 
would fear the imposition of social sanctions and feelings of guilt should [she] act otherwise.”  Id. at 1131 
(footnote omitted).  
Ofer Azar propounds an explanation for tipping that echoes this rationale in that it describes the 
tipper’s utility as increasing by virtue both of the tipper herself and of societal approval: “[T]ipping may 
result in a positive utility from feeling generous and because consumers often feel empathy for the worker 
who serves them, and want to show their gratitude by leaving him a tip . . . .”  Id.; cf. Levmore, Norms as 
Supplements, supra note 2, at 1996 (“There is . . . something awkward about—which is to say there is a 
mysterious norm against—tipping across or up the socioeconomic ladder, and perhaps a positive theory 
should limit itself to the presence or absence of discretionary transfers to relatively low-earning providers.” 
(footnote omitted)); id. at 1996 n.9 (“Something of this sort may be at stake in the (old-fashioned) norm of 
refraining from tipping when the service provider owns the establishment.  The cultural interpretation of 
this practice is that the entrepreneur is more of an equal and that it might be insulting to suggest that an 
immediate ex-post evaluation is necessary to encourage effort.”).
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source, where the job itself is of relatively low salary.  Why, then, should laborers agree 
to accept some of their income—indeed, as statistics on tipping suggest, a large portion of 
their income—in the form of tips, which in theory they have no right to receive?
Here, again, our explanation offers an answer to this question that other theories 
do  not.    Laborers  prefer  jobs  that  include  tip-based  compensation  because  that 
compensation, historically at least, was tax-free.  
Continuing  our  interest  in  the  laborer’s  perspective  on  tipping,  we  proceed  to 
discuss the economic incentives that tipping creates for laborers and their employers.  In 
particular, we discuss how employees and (to the extent they are authorized to mandate 
it) employers choose whether or not to invoke tip-pooling—i.e., sharing of tips among 
employees.    We  also  discuss  how  tip-pooling  arrangements  may  affect  cooperation 
among laborers.
In  Part  I  of  this  Article,  we  provide  a  broad  overview  of  tipping.    Part  II 
summarizes the labor and tax laws governing tips and tipping.  In Part III, we examine 
tipping from the laborers’ perspective.  Focusing on restaurant workers, we look first at 
employees’ and employers’  general response to tipping, and then turn to the specific 
question of tip pooling, both as initiated voluntarily by waitstaff and as mandated by 
employers.  
I. Overview of Tipping
For  purposes  of  this  paper,  we  consider  tipping  to  include  situations  where 
individuals  give  money  to  providers  of  service,  purportedly  in  relation  to  particular 
provisions of service.
14  Tipping is a custom.  It is required neither by law nor by private 
contract.  It varies across geographic areas and social and occupational settings.  
Tipping extends to various areas where services are offered, including restaurant 
service, taxicab use, valet parking, and hotel services.
15  And the tips are significant in 
terms of the national economy.  Tips for the nation’s two million waitresses and waiters 
are  estimated  to  total  well  in  excess  of  $20  billion  annually.
16    Indeed,  “millions  of 
14 It is possible to conceive of far more inclusive definitions of tipping.  For example, one might argue that 
a lawyer’s Christmas present to her assistant is a form of a tip.  We restrict our discussion here to tips that 
fall within the definition in the text.
15 See  Michael  Lynn,  Tipping  in  Restaurants  and  Around  the  Globe:  An  Interdisciplinary  Review,  in
Foundations and Extensions of Behavioral Economics: A Handbook 2 (Morris Altman ed., forthcoming 
2004) (“[T]ipping is  not confined to restaurant  servers .  . . . In the U.S., consumers  also tip barbers, 
bartenders, beauticians, bellhops, casino croupiers, chambermaids, concierges, delivery persons, doormen, 
golf  caddies,  limousine  drivers,  maitre-d’s,  masseuses,  parking  attendants,  pool  attendants,  porters, 
restaurant  musicians,  washroom  attendants,  shoeshine  boys,  taxicab  drivers,  and  tour  guides  among 
others . . . .”)  
16 See Lynn, Tip Levels and Service, supra note [check], at 139 (estimate of $21 billion); Azar, supra note 
1, at 1084 (estimate of $26 billion).  The broad restaurant industry constitutes a substantial portion of the 
United States economy.  See, e.g., Sherri Day, Restaurant Hiring May Lead the Way to Wider Job Gains, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2003, at [check] (“Since the beginning of August, the restaurant business, which 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressLaw and Economics of Tipping 6
[American] workers . . . derive a significant portion of their income, often most of it, 
from tips.”
17  Further, while local customs often vary, the notion of tipping is by no 
means restricted to the United States.
18
A substantial academic literature has developed on the psychology and sociology 
of tipping.  Economic interest in the subject is more recent and, by comparison, little has 
been written on the economics of tipping.
19  More generally, the academic literature—
including  the  economic  literature—tends  to  focus  on  tipping  from  the  consumer 
perspective and to ignore the perspective of laborers.
20  We seek to fill that gap with this 
Article.  
II. Overview of the Legal Treatment of Tips
a. Labor Law
i. Minimum Wage
Through the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”),
21 Congress has established a 
national minimum wage.
22  The statute sets out a slightly modified standard for so-called 
“tipped  employees”—that  is,  employees  “engaged  in  an  occupation  in  which  [they] 
customarily  and  regularly  receive[]  more  than  $30  a  month  in  tips.”
23    While  tipped 
employees must receive at least the minimum wage, they may receive a portion of their 
compensation in the form of tips rather than direct cash wages.  Prior to 1996, the FLSA 
allowed up to 50 percent of tipped employees’ wages to be in the form of tips.
24   In 
includes everything from McDonald’s to corner bars to four-star restaurants, has accounted for 18 percent 
of the 300,000 jobs created in the nation.”).
17 Azar, supra note 1, at 1084 (“[S]ervers in full course restaurants earn 58 percent of their income from 
tips; those in counters earn 61 percent of their earnings in tips (in fact, the true percentages are likely to be 
much higher, because tips are often unreported.”).  
18 See Lynn, supra note 2, at 2 (“Although not as common as in the U.S., tipping is also practiced in most 
countries around the world.”).
19 See  Azar,  supra  note  1,  at  1085  (“While  tipping  was  the  subject  of  many  studies  in  psychology, 
economists for some mysterious reason hardly explored the economic implications of tipping.”); see also
Lynn, supra note 14, at 16 (“The empirical literature on tipping . . . is dominated by psychologists.  Only 
recently have economists begun to collect and analyze data on this phenomenon.”).  
20 See Lynn, supra note 14, at 16 (“Most [economic] models, theories and speculations [of tipping] address 
one of two questions – (1) Why do rational individuals leave tips? and (2) How has the custom of tipping 
evolved?”). 
21 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219.
22 See id. § 206(a)(1).  Since 1997, the minimum wage has been set at $5.15 per hour.  See id.
23 29 U.S.C. § 203(t).  
24 Prior to its 1996 amendment, the FLSA provided: 
In determining the wage of a tipped employee, the amount paid such employee by his employer 
shall be deemed to be increased on account of tips by an amount determined by the employer, but 
not by an amount in excess of . . . 50 percent of the applicable minimum wage rate after March 31, 
1991, except that the amount of the increase on account of tips determined by the employer may 
not exceed the value of tips actually received by the employee.
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1996, Congress amended the FLSA to “allow employers to take greater tip credits as the 
minimum  wage  increased.”
25    Current  law  sets  the  minimum  compensation  cash 
compensation  due  tipped  employees  at  “the  cash  wage  required  to  be  paid  such  an 
employee on August 20, 1996”,
26 i.e., $2.13.
27  Thus, current law allows more than 58.6 
percent of the current $5.15 hourly minimum wage to come in the form of tips.
28  The 
amount of compensation that an employer may provide to a tipped employee in the form 
of tips and credit toward the employee’s minimum wage is called the “tip credit.”
29
The FLSA imposes two requirements that an employer must meet in order to take 
advantage of the tip credit with respect to an employee: first, the employer must advise 
the employee of its intent to “treat tips as satisfying part of the employer’s minimum 
wage obligation,”
30 and, second, it must allow the employee to retain “all tips received by 
such employee.”
31
The FLSA sets only a federal minimum wage floor; it explicitly authorizes state 
and  local  governments  free  to  impose  higher  minimum  wage  requirements.
32    And, 
indeed,  some  jurisdictions  have  imposed  higher  minimum  wages  than  federal  law 
requires.
33
29 U.S.C. § 203(m) (1994).  The minimum wage in effect from 1991 through October 1, 1996 was $4.25 
per hour.  See id. § 206(a)(1); Kilgore v. Outback Steakhouse of Fla., Inc., 160 F.3d 294, 297 (6th Cir. 
1998).  Thus, employers had to provide $2.13 in minimum cash compensation to tipped employees.  See
Myers v. Copper Cellar Corp., 192 F.3d 546, 548 & n.3 (6th Cir. 1999).  
25 Kilgore, 160 F.3d at 298 n.3.
26 29 U.S.C. § 203(m).  
27 See infra note [check].
28 Prior to 1996, the FLSA mandated that up to 50% of tipped employees’ minimum wages could be in the 
form of tips: 
In determining the wage of a tipped employee, the amount paid such employee by his employer 
shall be deemed to be increased on account of tips by an amount determined by the employer, but 
not by an amount in excess of . . . 50 percent of the applicable minimum wage rate after March 31, 
1991, except that the amount of the increase on account of tips determined by the employer may 
not exceed the value of tips actually received by the employee.
29 U.S.C. § 203(m) (1994).  The minimum wage in effect from 1991 through October 1, 1996 was $4.25 
per hour.  See id. § 206(a)(1); Kilgore, 160 F.3d at 297.  Thus, employers had to provide $2.13 in minimum 
cash compensation to tipped employees.  See Myers, 192 F.3d at 548 & n.3.  
In  1996,  Congress  amended  the  FLSA  to  “allow  employers  to  take  greater  tip  credits  as  the 
minimum wage increased.”  Kilgore, 160 F.3d at 298 n.3.  
29 See Kilgore, 160 F.3d at 298; 29 C.F.R. § 531.51.  
30 Kilgore, 160 F.3d at 298.  Section 203(m) of the Act itself requires employers to inform the tipped 
employee “of the provisions of this subsection.”  29 U.S.C. § 203(m).  The court in Kilgore interpreted this 
to require “an employer [to] inform the employee that it intends to treat tips as satisfying part of the 
employer’s minimum wage obligation.  . . . In other words, an employer must inform its employees of its 
intent to take a tip credit toward the employer’s minimum wage obligation.”  Kilgore, 160 F.3d at 298.  
31 29 U.S.C. § 203(m).
32 Id. § 218(a) (“No provision of this chapter or of any order thereunder shall excuse noncompliance with 
any Federal or State law or municipal ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher than the minimum 
wage established under this chapter . . . .”).
33 See, e.g., Wessels, supra note [check], at 347 tbl. 1 (1986 data).
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ii. Splitting and Pooling of Tips
Tipped employees do not always retain the tips that they receive for themselves.  
First, the employees may engage in “tip splitting” with other restaurant employees; for 
example,  waiters  may  opt  to  split  tips—or,  as  it  also  described,  to  “tip  out”—other 
employees, such as members of the bus staff.
34  Second, tipped employees may engage in 
“tip  pooling”  with  other  employees—i.e.,  to  share  tips  on  a  regular  basis  with  other 
employees.  
Two issues arise in connection with tip pooling.  First, is the tip credit available 
where tip pooling occurs?  Second, may employers require tip pooling, or must tipped 
employees agree to such an arrangement?  
With regard to the availability of the tip credit, one at first blush might read the 
statutory “tip credit” requirement—that the employer must allow the employee to retain 
“all  tips  received  by  such  employee”
35—as  foreclosing  the  possibility  of  tip  pooling 
where a tip credit is sought.  But the statute goes on explicitly to reject this reading, 
directing that it “shall not be construed to prohibit the pooling of tips among employees 
who  customarily  and  regularly  receive  tips.”
36    A  Department  of  Labor  regulation 
explicitly endorses tip pooling even where a tip credit is sought.
37
Courts and the Department of Labor have interpreted the Fair Labor Standards 
Act to allow tip pooling both as a voluntary matter, and as mandated by employers.
38
In fact, state minimum wage laws predate federal minimum wage legislation.  See William P. 
Quigley, ‘A Fair Day’s Pay for a Fair Day’s Work’: Time to Raise and Index the Minimum Wage, 27 ST. 
MARY’S L.J. 513, 516-20 (1996) (presenting the history of early state minimum wage laws); see generally
Willis J. Norlund, A Brief History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 39 LAB. L.J. 715 (1988) [check].  
34 See 6 West Ltd. Corp. v. NLRB, 237 F.3d 767, 772 n.8 (7th Cir. 2001) (“It is a common practice for 
servers to ‘tip-out’ other employees, such as bartenders, busboys, and hostesses, after their shift.”); but cf.
Wessels, supra note [check], at 336 (“[T]he current use of tip outs is small.”).  
35 Supra note [check].
36 29 U.S.C. § 203(m).  
37 The regulation, captioned “Tip pooling”, elucidates:
Where employees practice tip splitting, as where waiters give a portion of their tips to the 
busboys, both the amounts retained by the waiters and those given the busboys are considered tips 
of the individuals who retain them . . . . Similarly, where an accounting is made to an employer for 
his  information  only  or  in  furtherance  of  a  pooling  arrangement  whereby  the  employer 
redistributes the tips to the employees upon some basis to which they have mutually agreed among 
themselves, the amounts received and retained by each individual as his own are counted as his 
tips for purposes of the Act.
29 C.F.R. § 531.54.
38 See, e.g., Kilgore, 160 F.3d at 303-04 (concluding that the FLSA “expressly permits the ‘pooling of tips’ 
and does not bar employers from requiring tip pooling”); cf. 5 EMPLOY. COORDINATOR ¶ C-14,116 (“Do 
not be misled by [29 C.F.R. § 531.54] of the Wage and Hour Division’s regulations, which suggests that all 
tip-pooling arrangements must be mutually agreed on by the employees.  This regulation no longer reflects 
the policy of the division.”).  
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Mandatory tipping pools may extend only to employees “who customarily and regularly 
receive tips.”
39  Tipped employees enjoy more latitude in crafting voluntary tip pooling 
arrangements than employers have in mandating them.
40  States remain free to impose 
bars against employer-mandated tip pooling.
41
b. Tax Law
Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code requires individuals to include in gross 
income  “all  income  from  whatever  source  derived,  including  . . .  compensation  for 
services.”
42  Tips, therefore, are subject to the income tax.
43
The Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor has taken the position that an employer 
cannot  require  employees  “to  contribute  a  greater  percentage  of  their  tips  than  is  customary  and 
reasonable”; the Division has elucidated that a mandatory tipping pool is “customary and reasonable” if 
employees retain at least 15% of their tips.  1 LES A. SCHNEIDER & J. LARRY STINE, WAGE AND HOUR 
LAW:  COMPLIANCE  AND  PRACTICE  § 7:9.    But  the  court  of  appeals  in  Kilgore  recently  rejected  the 
Division’s interpretation as supported neither by the language of the statute or regulations, and as unentitled 
to deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  See Kilgore, 160 F.3d at 302-03 
(finding that the only valid restriction on mandatory tipping pools is that tipped employees’ wages remain 
at or above the applicable minimum wage).
39 29 U.S.C. § 203(m).  Compare Kilgore, 160 F.3d at 301-02 ((holding that restaurant hosts at Outback 
Steakhouses  “work  in  an  occupation  that  customarily  and  regularly  receives  tips,”  and  in  doing  so 
contrasting  hosts  with  “restaurant  employees  like  dishwashers,  cooks,  or  off-hour  employees  like  an 
overnight janitor who do not directly relate with customers at all”).), with Myers v. Copper Cellar Corp., 
192 F.3d 546, 550-51 (6th Cir. 1999) (“Because [Copper Cellar “salad makers”] abstained from any direct 
intercourse with diners, worked entirely outside the view of restaurant patrons, and solely performed duties 
traditionally classified as food preparation or kitchen support work, they could not validly be categorized as 
“tipped employees” under section 203(m),” and therefore were not improperly included in a mandatory 
tipping pool.).
40 See Schneider & Stine, supra note [check], § 7:9 (“Despite these requirements [that tip pools not extend 
to employees who do not customarily and regularly receive tips and that (to the extent it remains valid, see
supra  note  [check])  tipped  employees  retain  15%  of  their  tips]  for  involuntary  pooling  arrangements 
imposed by [an] employer, employees may enter pooling arrangements with terms which do not conform to 
these rules if the contributing employees mutually agree to such terms.” (footnote omitted)).
41 See  Jameson  v.  Five  Fleet  Restaurant,  Inc.,  131  Cal.  Rptr.  2d  771,  776  (Ct.  App.  4th  Dist.  2003) 
(“Because [California law] imposes prohibitions on tip pooling not contained in the FLSA, . . . federal 
authorities  . . .  are  inapplicable.”);  id.  (“Under  [California  law],  tip  pooling  is  only  permitted  among 
employees  who are  neither employers nor agents”).   Some states  have statutes that expressly prohibit 
employer-mandated  tip  pooling.    See  Wessels,  supra  note  [check],  at  336;  see,  e.g.,  MINN.  STAT.
§ 177.24(3) (“No employer may require an employee to contribute or share a gratuity received by the 
employee with the employer or other employees or to contribute any or all of the gratuity to a fund or pool 
operated for the benefit of the employer or employees. This section does not prevent an employee from 
voluntarily and individually sharing gratuities  with other employees. The agreement to share gratuities 
must be made by the employees free of any employer participation.”).  But that position is hardly uniform.  
Compare Matter of Wage & Hour Violations of Holly, Inn Inc., 386 N.W.2d 385, 310 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1986) (Minnesota “statutes indicate that mandatory tip sharing is not allowed.”), with Leighton v. Old 
Heidelberg,  Ltd.,  268  Cal.  Rptr.  647,  649-53  (Ct.  App.  2d  Dist.  1990)  (California  law  does  preclude 
employer-mandated tip pooling); Alford v. Harolds Club, 669 P.2d 721, 723-24 (Nev. 1983) (same result 
under Nevada law); Fraser v. Pears Co., 16 Mass. L. Rptr. 255 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2003) (same result under 
Massachusetts law).
42 I.R.C. § 61(a)(1); William A. Raabe, G. E. Whittenburg & Devona D. Newport, Power Swings to IRS on 
Assessment of Employer FICA Tax on Tipped Employees, 6 J. TAX’N EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 260, 260 (1999) 
(“Money received in the form of tips is Section 61 gross income.”).
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Tips are also subject to Federal Insurance Contribution Act (“FICA”) taxes on 
wages that go toward the social security fund.
44  FICA establishes independent taxes on 
employees
45  and  employers.
46    Employees  must  pay  a  percentage  of  their  “wages” 
earned,
47  with  “wages”  defined  generally  as  “all  remuneration  for  employment.”
48
Employers must pay a FICA tax equal to a percentage of “the wages . . . paid . . . with 
respect to employment.”
49  Section 3121 of the Internal Revenue Code provides, subject 
to a de minimis exception,
50 that “tips received by an employee in the course of his 
employment shall be considered remuneration for such employment (and deemed to have 
been paid by the employer . . . ).”
51
Tips  were  historically  not  subject  to  FICA  taxation.    As  the  Federal  Circuit 
recently explained:
Tips were not always subject to FICA tax liability.   In 1965, Congress 
amended  the  law  to  require  employers  to  withhold  FICA  taxes  based  on  tip 
income and to allow employees’ Social Security wage earnings accounts to be 
credited  for  tip  income  earned.    . . .  Tips,  however,  were  not  considered 
remuneration for employment for purposes of the employer’s share of the FICA 
tax.
The  Social  Security  Amendments  of  1977  established  the  duty  of  an 
employer to pay FICA taxes on some of the tips received by its employees.  . . . 
Employers were required to pay FICA tax on tips received by employees up to the 
amount of the federal minimum wage.  . . . As a result, employees were subject to 
FICA  taxes  on  all  tips,  but  employers  were  exempt  from  FICA  taxes  for  the 
amount of employee tip income in excess of the federal minimum wage.   In 
1987, Congress established an employer duty to pay FICA taxes on all tips that 
fall within the definition of “wages.”
52
 In  addition  to  income  and  FICA  taxes,  tips  are  also  subject  to  federal 
unemployment tax act (“FUTA”) liability.  The FUTA tax is levied on employers, and is 
43 TREAS. REG. § 1.61-2(a)(1) (“[T]ips . . . are income to the recipients unless excluded by law.”); see, e.g., 
Cracchiola  v.  Comm’r,  643  F.2d  1383,  1384  (9th  Cir.  1981)  (rejecting  as  “totally  without  merit”  the 
argument that waiters’ and waitresses’ tips are not gross income within the purview of the Internal Revenue 
Code).
44 See Bubble Room v. United States, 159 F.3d 553, 555-57 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  This was not always the case:
Id. at 557 (citations omitted).
45 See I.R.C. § 3101.
46 See id. § 3111.
47 See id. § 3101.
48 Id. § 3121(a).
49 Id. § 3111.  
50 Section 3121(a)(12)(B) provides that wages “shall not include . . . cash tips received by an employee in 
any calendar month in the course of his employment by an employer unless the amount of such cash tips is 
$20 or more.”  Id. § 3121(a)(12)(B).
51 Id. § 3121(q).  This is subject to the general exception that remuneration received by an employee does 
not include amounts in excess of the applicable “contribution and benefit base” under the Social Security 
Act.  Id. § 3121(a)(1).  
52 Bubble Room v. United States, 159 F.3d 553, 557 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). 
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based  upon  the  “total  wages”  paid  to  those  in  each  employer’s  employ.
53    Code 
section 3306(s) provides that “the term ‘wages’ includes tips” for FUTA purposes.
54
Like FICA tax liability, FUTA tax liability based upon tips is a comparatively 
recent  development.    Section  3306(s)  was  enacted  in  1984  and  became  effective  in 
1986.
55
With this overview of the applicable tax law in place, we turn to the question of 
how the Internal Revenue Service (the “Service”) enforces the various tax liabilities for 
tip income.  For years, the Service has had to deal with tip-compensated employees who 
do not have adequate documentation of their tip-based income.  In response, the Service 
has developed methods to approximate tip income based upon factors such as charged tip 
data  and  restaurant  income.
56    The  Service  has  applied  similar  methods  to  estimate 
employer tax liability arising from employee tip liability.  The courts have been receptive 
to these methods; recently the Supreme Court endorsed the use of such a method in the 
employer tax liability context.
57
To aid in tax enforcement, Code section 6053 requires all employees who receive 
tips as wages to furnish their employers with monthly statements of tips received.
58  The 
Code imposes more onerous reporting requirements on so-called “large food or beverage 
establishments”.
59  Among these requirements
60 is the obligation to allocate tip income 
among employees.
61  That allocation must be reported both to the Service and to each 
affected  employee.
62    The  Code  provision  further  directs  employers  at  large  food  or 
beverage establishment to 
53 See I.R.C. § 3301.
54 More precisely, the Code section provides that, for FUTA purposes,
the term “wages” includes tips which are—
(1) received while performing services which constitute employment, and
(2) included in a written statement furnished to the employer pursuant to section 6053(a).
I.R.C. § 3306(s).
55 47B C.J.S. Internal Revenue § 584 (2004).
56 This approach was first approved by the Tax Court in McQuatters v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1122 (1973), action on dec. (May 21, 1974) (acq.).  The Service, courts and commentators generally refer 
to similar formula-based estimates to be conducted under a “McQuatters formula”.  See, e.g., Bryan E. 
Gates, 2 I.R.M. ABR. & ANN. § 4.23.7.13 (2003).
57 See United States v. Fior D’Italia, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 2117 (2002) (holding that the Internal Revenue Service 
is justified in basing a restaurant’s FICA tax liability on an estimate of the amount that all customers tip all 
restaurant employees).
58 See I.R.C. § 6053(a).
59 A “large food or beverage establishment” is defined as 
any trade or business (or portion thereof)—
(A) which provides food or beverages,
(B) with  respect  to  which  the  tipping  of  employees  serving  food  or  beverages  by 
customers is customary, and 
(C) which normally employed more than 10 employees on a typical business day during 
the preceding calendar year.
Id. § 6053(c)(4).  
60 See generally id. § 6053(c).  
61 See id. § 6053(c)(1)(D), (E).
62 See id. § 6053(c)(1)(E), (2)(C).  
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic PressLaw and Economics of Tipping 12
allocate  (as  tips  for  [reporting]  purposes  . . .  )  among  employees  performing 
services during any payroll period who customarily receive tip income an amount 
equal to the excess of—
(i) 8 percent of the gross receipts (other than nonallocable receipts) 
of such establishment for the payroll period, over
(ii) the  aggregate  amount  reported  by  such  employees  to  the 
employer  under  subsection  (a)  [which  requires  employees  to 
report tip income to employers] for such period.
63
The allocation is to be conducted either “on the basis of a good faith agreement by the 
employer and the employees”
64 or pursuant to applicable regulations.
65
III. Tipping from the Laborer’s Perspective
a. Acceptance of Tip-Based Compensation
An  initial  question  is  why  employees  would  be  willing  to  accept  tip-based 
compensation.    Most  individuals  are  risk-averse  when  it  comes  to  compensation—
especially those who, like many who receive tip-based income, are low-salary earners.  
Tip-based compensation is inherently riskier than standard wage compensation.  Why, 
then, should tipping be as widespread as it is in service industries?
Tax incentives provide an answer to this question.  As noted above, the taxation 
of tip-based income is of relatively recent vintage for FICA and FUTA tax purposes.
66
Moreover, even to the extent that tip-based income is subject to taxation, the government 
faces enforcement difficulties that are larger than in most other forms of compensation.  
Indeed, an Internal Revenue Service study of tipping practices in the foodservice industry 
in 1984 reported that “only one-third of tip income is reported.”
67  Michael Lynn explains 
that “[t]ipping allows servers to pay lower income taxes because under-reporting of tip 
income is more difficult for the government to catch than is under-reporting of standard 
wages.”
68
63 Id. § 6053(c)(3)(A).  Under subsection (c)(3)(C), “[u]pon the petition of the employer or the majority of 
employees of such employer, the Secretary may reduce (but not below 2 percent) the percentage of gross 
receipts required to be allocated under subparagraph (A) where he determines that the percentage of gross 
receipts constituting tips is less than 8 percent.”  Id. § 6053(c)(3)(C).
64 Id. § 6053(c)(3)(B)(i).  
65 Id. § 6053(c)(3)(B)(ii).  
66 See supra Part II.b.
67 IRS, TIP INCOME STUDY: A STUDY OF TIPPING PRACTICES IN THE FOOD SERVICE INDUSTRY FOR 1984 i 
(1990).
68 Lynn, supra note [check], at 24.  Cf. Azar, supra note 4, at 1089 (describing how an Israeli court decision 
mandating  that  tipped  employees  receive  minimum  cash  wages  in  addition  to  tips  resulted  in  many 
restaurants  simply  imposing  fixed  service  charges  and,  while  increasing  nominally  waitstaff’s  salary, 
reducing waitstaff’s overall pay); but cf. Walter John Wessels, Minimum Wages and Tipped Servers, 35 
ECON. INQUIRY 334 (1997) (arguing that an increase in the minimum cash wage will result in an increase in 
minimum wage-level restaurant worker employment).  Still, the import of the minimum wage on restaurant 
workers is tempered by the fact that many restaurant laborers earn in excess of the minimum wage.  See, 
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Service providers’ lower tax burden inures as well to the benefit of employers and 
customers.    Lynn  elucidates:  “[T]ipping  allows  customers  to  pay  lower  sales  taxes 
because (by lowering restaurants’ labor costs) it reduces the prices restaurants charge for 
meals.    Together,  these  tax  evasion  opportunities  benefit  customers,  servers,  and 
restaurateurs by reducing the costs of supplying services.”
69
Still, commentators have questioned whether tax evasion offers a full explanation 
for tipping.  First, Lynn notes that the 
finding that tipping is more prevalent in countries with lower tax burdens casts 
doubt on the idea that tipping exists as a means of evading taxes.  The motivation 
to evade taxes should be greater the higher those taxes, so if tipping customs are 
actively supported because they are a means of evading taxes, then tipping should 
be more (not less) prevalent the greater a nation’s tax burden.
70
Lynn  cites  unpublished  findings  indicated  that  in  fact  a  greater  national  tax  burden 
correlates with less tipping, not more.
71
Second, Örn Bodvarsson and William Gibson observe that, “[w]hile it is not clear 
when tipping began, it  certainly predates income taxes.”
72  They also  assert (without 
citation)  that  “[a]ttempts  at  more  rigorous  collection  of  tip  income  by  Canadian  and 
American authorities have not had discernible impacts on restaurant tipping.”
73
Third, Zvi Schwartz and Eli Cohen have conducted an empirical cross-country 
study of the relation between the national tax burden and the number of tipped-service 
occupations.
74  Their study revealed a negative correlation between the two statistics.
75
Schwartz and Cohen argue that their findings tend to rebut the “tax evasion” explanation 
for  tipping,
76  arguing  that  the  negative  correlation  instead  supports  the  “disposable 
income effect”—that is, that a higher tax burden leaves less income to be spent on, and 
therefore reduces demand for, superior goods, such as services that warrant tipping.
77
e.g., Day, supra note 8 (“While wages are relatively low for restaurant workers, not all the jobs are at the 
bottom of the wage scale . . . . Even burger restaurants pay new hires well above the federal minimum 
wage . . . .”).  Many of these jobs, however, may not reap much in the way of tips.  
69 Id. at 24-25; see also Örn B. Bodvarsson & William A. Gibson, Economics and Restaurant Gratuities, 
56 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 187, 188 (1997) (“Gratuities increase the scope for income tax evasion that could 
lower the cost of service to customers and restaurateurs alike.”).
70 Lynn, supra note [check], at 25.
71 Id. at 15, 25.  
72 Bodvarsson & Gibson, supra note [check], at 201 n.4.
73 Id.
74 See Zvi  Schwartz  & Eli  Cohen,  Tipping and the Nation’s Tax Burden: A Cross-Country Study, 10 
ANATOLIA: INT’L J. TOURISM & HOSPITALITY RES. 135 (1999).
75 See id. at 141-45.  
76 See id. at 137, 145.
77 See id. at 137-38, 145.  
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While Schwartz and Cohen’s findings are informative, they do not establish that 
the tax evasion explanation of tipping is devoid of validity.  First, they rely upon the total 
taxes imposed by a nation; a more focused approach would look in particular to taxes that 
are likely to have an impact, if they are collected, on workers’ wages.  Second, they use 
as the relevant statistic the number of tipped professions, but not the number of tipped 
professionals or the total amount of tips in fact paid.  
In addition, our focus in this Article is on the perspective of the laborer.  And, to 
return to our assertion above, it is logical—and Schwartz and Cohen’s findings do not 
contradict—that laborers, who ordinarily would prefer the security of a fixed wage, might 
agree to accept some remuneration in the form of tips because of the wage enhancement 
that results from the opportunity for tax reduction.
Moreover,  another  aspect  of  Schwartz  and  Cohen’s  study  provides  indirect 
support for the notion that tax evasion may underlie tipping.  Schwartz and Cohen also 
sought to evaluate the “crowding out” effect as applied to tipping.  The “crowding out” 
effect generally posits that government and charity compete for available dollars; thus, 
the  more  the  government  affirmatively  engages  in  wealth  redistribution,  the  less  the 
citizenry will be inclined to donate to charity.
78  Thus, if it is in fact true that tipping 
results  from  people’s  generosity,  then  “crowding  out”  effect  should  apply  to  tipping: 
“Higher levels of imposed wealth redistribution reduce charity in general and consumers’ 
tendency to tip in particular.”
79
In  order  to  evaluate  the  “crowding  out”  hypothesis,  Schwartz  and  Cohen 
considered the relationship between the number of tipped professions and the differing 
portion of tax monies that various countries transferred to the poor through social security 
and welfare programs.
80   But their findings did not indicate that the two statistics were 
related  in  a  statistically  significant  way.
81    They  thus  reject  the  “crowding  out” 
hypothesis,
82  and  speculate  that  perhaps  “tipping  has  less  to  do  with  generosity  than 
previously thought.”
83  That, in turn, suggests that tipping has some economic motive 
underlying it, which takes us back to our earlier point.
Note,  moreover,  that  there  is  at  least  anecdotal  evidence  that  the  acceptable 
tipping  rate  in  the  United  States  has  gone  in  recent  years  from  10-15%  to  15-20%.  
(There may also have been, however, an increase in the tendency to charge tips on credit 
cards, which reduces the opportunity not to report tip income to the tax authorities.)
b. General Waiter/Waitress Behavior
The traditional—and to some degree, although not altogether, accurate—view that 
tipping  is  proportionate  to  quality  of  service  should  incentivize  tipped  employees  to 
78 See id. at 138.  
79 Id.
80 See id. at 139-40.  
81 Id. at 145.  
82 Id.
83 Id.
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provide quality individualized service to each customer.  To the extent that, as studies 
have  shown,  other  factors  influence  tip  size,  one  would  expect  knowledgeable  (or 
intuitive) employees to modify their behavior so as to take advantage of these factors as 
well.  Thus, waiters and waitresses may write “Thank you” on the bill, or try to engage 
their customers in friendly conversation.  
Management also generally has an incentive to help tipped employees maximize 
their tips, insofar as higher tips both (i) can help to provide a “tip credit” for minimum-
wage employees, and (ii) more importantly effectively increases employees’ wages, with 
the result that management can expect to hire better qualified employees which should 
translate into more repeat business and higher profits.  Thus, we can expect management 
to provide training to employees as to how to increase tip income—provided that the cost 
of this training is outweighed by the benefit to the owner of the training.
84
c. Tip Pooling
We consider tip pooling under two circumstances.  First, we consider the setting 
where waitstaff themselves decide whether or not to engage in tip pooling.  Then we 
consider the scenario in which management decides to impose tip pooling.
i. Voluntary Tip Pooling
If management does not mandate tip pooling, then waitstaff enjoy the prerogative 
to decide whether, and if so with whom and to what extent, to pool tips.
85  In accordance 
with standard economic assumptions, we assume generally that in making these decisions 
each  waiter  or  waitress  seeks  to  maximize  his  or  her  own  profits.
86    Under  these 
conditions, we can view waiters and waitresses as a restaurant as private businesspeople 
independently providing services to restaurant customers.  To be sure, the waiters and 
waitresses  do  not  compete  for  individual  customers  as  do,  for  example,  competing 
restaurants.
87  Rather, the waitstaff service the customers that choose to patronize the 
restaurant at which the waitstaff work.  Still, we may view each waitress or waiter as 
purchasing food from the restaurant kitchen, which she or he then resells to the customers 
seated as her or his tables.  The waitresses and waiters enjoy the profits (in the form of 
84 See Lynn, Tip Levels and Service, supra note [check], at 148 (“Research on tipping makes it clear that 
. . . managers should train servers to take one or more of 14 tip-enhancing actions.”).
This phenomenon helps to explain the recent proliferation of “standard” waitering observable at 
eateries such as Friday’s and Houlihan’s, where waiters and waitresses will introduce themselves by first 
name and sit down at the table (or kneel down next to it) when taking orders.  One might ask whether such 
training may render the service that these waiters and waitresses provide less “customized” to individual 
customers, and therefore on at least some theories less of a proper basis for tipping.  See supra [check].  On 
the other hand, the recent increase in requests for tips in fast-food-like establishments like Starbucks, see
supra [check], suggests that the tipping norm may be shifting in this regard.
85 Even if management mandates tip pooling, waitstaff presumably remains free to implement tip pooling 
that extends beyond management’s mandate.
86 But see Cass R. Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 207 (2001) 
(“[W]orkers are like most people.  They behave like homo sapiens, not like homo economicus.” (footnote 
omitted)).
87 We address the possibility of [using maitre d’] below.  [check]
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tips),
88 and they must decide how to structure restaurant service so as to maximize those 
profits.
89
1. Degrees of Cooperation
To begin, the waitstaff must decide how much they will cooperate.  Saul Levmore 
has offered theories as to why firms might, and might not, cooperate with each other 
under  competitive  conditions.
90    First,  Levmore  identifies  different  degrees  of 
cooperation:  explicit  cooperation,  and  varying  degrees  of  implicit  cooperation  and  of 
non-cooperation; he delineates them in the context of two competing firms that purchase 
like goods on  an ongoing basis.
91  Under the model of  explicit cooperation, the two 
competitors might engage in joint venture-like behavior and agree to own and operate a 
factory from which they both will purchase output.
92  Implicit cooperation arises if the 
two  firms  purchase  supplies  from  the  same  factory,  with  neither  of  the  competitors 
having  an  ownership  or  operational  interest  in  the  factory.
93    Stronger  implicit 
cooperation exists if the factory supplies goods to both competitors but is owned by one 
of  the  competitors.
94      Under  strict  non-cooperation,  firms  “may  refuse  to  deal  with 
suppliers who deal at all with competitor firms.”
95  A less strict form of non-cooperation 
envisions  firms  that  “refuse  to  deal  with  suppliers  who  sell  identical  components  to 
competitor firms.”
96
Levmore’s taxonomy of cooperation can be adapted to the setting of restaurants 
and waitstaff.  There is a minimal level of cooperation at a restaurant, insofar as the 
waiters and waitresses have at a minimum agreed to work at the same restaurant and 
(viewing each waitress and waiter as an independent operator) to offer the same food 
prepared by the same chefs.  To this extent, then, the waitstaff have agreed to cooperate 
implicitly.  Beyond that, the waitstaff remain free to choose a level of cooperation.  
An initial decision is whether the waitstaff will agree to engage in what we refer 
to as “explicit cooperation”—pooling of tips among all waiters and waitresses.  In the 
economic language of firm structure, this is the decision of whether or not to integrate 
horizontally.  If the waitstaff agree to cooperate explicitly, then a subsidiary decision 
arises—whether  or  not further  to  pool  tips  with  other  restaurant  workers  such  as  the 
busstaff.  Table 1 reflects these choices.  
88 Cf. Wessels, supra note [check], at 334-35 (“liken[ing] tipping to profit sharing”).
89 We discuss below the question of how waitstaff might choose whether, and the extent to which, to pool 
tips, see infra [check].
90 See Saul Levmore, Competition and Cooperation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 216 (1998) [hereinafter Levmore, 
Competition and Cooperation].
91 See id. at 217-18.
92 Id. at 218.
93 Id.
94 Id.  Levmore  describes  this  option  as  lying  between  the  first  two  insofar  as  “[t]he  trading  between 
competitors is now explicit although the investment in the factory was implicitly cooperative.”  Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
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TABLE 1 – OPTIONS UNDER EXPLICIT COOPERATION
Tip Pooling Restricted to Waitstaff; Other Services 
Effectively Purchased from Restaurant
Tip Pooling Extended to Other Staff
If the waiters and waitresses decide not to pool tips among one another, then in 
effect they will be in competition.   At this point, they must decide the degree to which 
they will implicitly cooperate with one another.
97  First, they might decide simply to 
share  (without  delineation)  the  support  staff  provided  by  the  restaurant.    Under  this 
scenario, the waiters and waitresses would not pool tips with other restaurant staff, and 
would simply use their services as needed; in Levmore’s terms the waitresses and waiters 
would  be  cooperating  implicitly  by  using  services  offered  by  a  single  provider—the 
restaurant.
A second option that reflects less cooperation is to have individual waiters and 
waitresses entice restaurant support staff to provide more (or faster) service to them by 
tipping the support staff as they provide services or at the end of each shift.  By this, we 
do not envision a formal tip-pooling arrangement between waitstaff and support staff; 
rather, waitresses and waiters provide tips on an individual basis as they see fit.  This 
notion may be of greater applicability with respect to certain support staff services than 
others.  For example, the notion of a waitress tipping a busboy for prompt service on an 
individual  basis  might  be  difficult  in  practice,  but  waitresses  at  some  restaurants  do 
indeed  tip  the  individuals  manning  the  beverage  or  dessert  bars  for  faster  service.
98
Under this scenario, the waitstaff are still using services provided by the restaurant, but 
they are openly competing with one another for priority with respect to those services.
A third option that reflects even less cooperation among the waitstaff is for the 
waitstaff to join with particular support staff and form “service teams” that share tips.  In 
the  economic  language  of  firms,  this  scenario  is  a  form  of  vertical  integration.    For 
example, each waiter might choose his or her own busperson; each team of waiter and 
busperson would then service only their own customers, and would pool tips obtained 
from  those  customers.    Under  this  scenario—minimal  cooperation—the  waiters  and 
waitresses  cooperate  with  one  another  only  with  respect  to  the  provision  of  foods 
prepared by the restaurant.
97 As noted above, there is a minimal level of implicit cooperation, so that non-cooperation is not an option.
98 Interview with Orin Tempkin [check].
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Figure  1  presents  the  varying  degrees  of  cooperation,  and  the  resulting  staff 
structures.  
FIGURE 1 – OPTIONS UNDER VARYING DEGREES OF COOPERATION
There  is  a  full  spectrum  of  cooperation  possibilities  beyond  the  four  distinct 
options presented in the figure.  For example, under minimal cooperation, it is possible 
that  waiters  will  offer  service  to  patrons  sitting  at  tables  outside  their  “station”  if 
specifically requested; it is also possible that they will absolutely refuse to service tables 
outside their station.  Similarly, a busperson who clears off a table may leave the tip on 
the table if the busperson was not responsible for the party who left the tip.
2. Waitstaff’s Choice Among Degrees of Cooperation
Having set out possible degrees of cooperation in which waitstaff might engage, 
we turn to the question of how waitstaff will choose a level of cooperation.  At the outset, 
we consider the means by which the waitstaff might arrive at that conclusion, i.e., the 
question of governance.  The governance question seems to us to be highly empirical.  
Nonetheless, we offer a few observations and conjectures on the subject.
As an initial matter, we think that, once a system (of tip pooling or no tip pooling) 
is in place, that system is likely to remain in place.  It seems likely to us that a particular 
arrangement will over time become settled at an existing establishment, and will (whether 
for reasons of inertia or otherwise) likely simply be accepted by new hires.
99
While the question of waitstaff governance is doubtless empirical, there is reason 
to believe that unanimous voluntary acceptance of tip pooling would be required—i.e., 
such  a  system  would  be  unlikely  to  be  accepted  unless  all  participants  agreed  to  it 
99 Cf. Sunstein, supra note [check], at 221 (“Default rules have a tendency to stick, in labor contracts as 
elsewhere.  If people are initially given a right to a certain good, they are likely to ask more to give it up 
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voluntarily.  Under our model, individual waiters and waitresses are akin to competitive 
entrepreneurs.  While it is possible that a particular waitstaff might agree to a particular 
form  of  governance  (majority  rule,  for  example),  it  still  seems  unlikely  that  such  an 
arrangement  could  be  reached  in  the  absence  of  initial  unanimous  agreement  to  the 
governance model.  In short, an independent actor need not agree to something unless she 
wants to, and probably will not agree to something unless she somehow sees it to be in 
her interest.
That said, the reality may be that unanimity does not translate into a strict system 
in which there is voting and each voter has a veto.  Instead, given the fact that the waiters 
and  waitresses  are  not  absolutely  independent  operators—they  do,  after  all,  work 
together—some effort might be had to achieve a consensus.  In this sense, the governance 
model may bear some of the characteristics of a “voluntary assent” voting rule.
100
Still,  given  the  need  to  satisfy  a  consensus  of  waitstaff,  it  seems  to  us  that 
voluntary movement toward greater cooperation will prove more difficult than movement 
toward less cooperation or retaining the status quo.   For similar reasons, an initial choice 
is more likely to involve less cooperation than more; indeed, the default rule is no tip 
pooling.   
We  thus  arrive  at  two  general  background  presumptions:  one  in  favor  of 
continuing the status quo, and another against greater degrees of cooperation.  But this 
does not mean that cooperation can never be achieved, or that change is not possible.  
First,  the  possibility  that  management  might  intervene  to  establish  tip  pooling 
might  make  voluntary  tip  pooling  more  likely.    To  the  extent  that  management  is 
empowered  to  mandate  tip  pooling,  the  shadow  of  management  compulsion  may 
convince waitstaff simply to come up with an agreement on their own, which they may 
prefer to whatever arrangement management might require.
101
Second,  it  may  be  in  the  economic  self-interest  of  waiters  and  waitresses  to 
engage in tip pooling.  For example, waitstaff might believe that tip pooling would lead 
to  uniformly  better  service,  which  would  in  turn  lead  to  increased  patronage  and 
increased tipping, such that all (or virtually all) members of the waitstaff would receive 
higher pay under a tip pooling regime.
102
100 See Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 
YALE  L.J.  677,  737-38  (1999)  (noting  that  “voluntary  assent”  is  the  voting  rule  for  international 
environmental treaty law, in part because of the custom of seeking a consensus).  The voting rule for 
restaurant waitstaff is not likely to be a pure version of voluntary assent insofar as “[v]oluntary [a]ssent 
cannot impose regulation on the unwilling.”  Id. at 738.  While voluntary assent is in practice quite close to 
unanimity, the two remain “slightly different” in that voluntary assent “does not require, as [u]nanimity 
does, the consent of every last voter to become binding on those who do consent.”  Id.
101 Even if the arrangement to which they agree is the same arrangement (or even is a worse arrangement 
than the arrangement) that management in fact would mandate, there may be psychological reasons that 
waitstaff would prefer to reach the tip pooling arrangement somewhat of their own accord.  [check].
102 Cf. Kaldor-Hicks [check].
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Third, considerations of behavioral law and economics may render tip pooling 
more likely.  Robert Frank and Cass Sunstein have argued that workers evaluate their 
satisfaction with their salaries based more upon how their salaries match up with other 
workers’  salaries,  than  on  their  salaries’  absolute  magnitude.
103    They  explain  that 
“[s]urveys of employers and employees suggest that salaries depend a great deal on what 
employees think other people are receiving, and that perceptions of relative position have 
large effects on morale.”
104  From this general consideration, one can reason—empirical 
studies tend to confirm—that workers who receive lower compensation than their co-
workers  will  see  the  salary  differential  as  a  negative  and  will  want  some  degree  of 
compensation for it.  In other words, “compensating wage differentials must be paid and 
are paid, not only for higher risks and less vacation time, but also for lower relative 
positions  within  firms.”
105    And,  because  higher-ranked  and  better-compensated 
employees benefit from the mere fact that they are earning more than their co-workers, it 
follows  that  “[e]veryone  can  do  better  if  the  top-ranked  workers  induce  their  lesser-
ranked colleagues to remain by sharing some of their pay with them.”
106
Frank and Sunstein predict that “the difference between productivity and pay will 
increase with the extensiveness of interaction between coworkers”
107—i.e., that the more 
closely people work together, the more likely they are to be willing to compensate lower-
ranked workers more highly.  Frank and Sunstein verify their prediction with respect to 
three occupations with varying degrees of worker interaction: real estate salesperson, and 
automobile salesperson, and research chemist.
Real  estate  salespersons,  who  have  the  least  intensive contact,  pay  the  lowest 
amounts for high-ranked positions.  At the other end of the spectrum, research 
chemists, who work together in close-knit groups for extended periods, pay very 
large sums indeed.  In the sample studied, the most productive chemists accounted 
for  over  $200,000  more  in  revenues  each  year  than  their  least  productive 
colleagues, yet received only slightly higher salaries.  Auto salespersons do not 
associate nearly as intensively as chemists, but unlike real estate salespersons, 
they  do  spend  their  working  hours  together  in  the  same  location.    And  as 
predicted, the price of high-ranked positions for auto salespersons lies between 
those of the other two occupations.
108
Like  auto  salespersons,  waiters  and  waitresses  “do  not  associate  nearly  as
intensively  as  chemists”;  they  also  “spend  their  working  hours  together  in  the  same 
location.”  Accordingly, one would expect higher-ranked and higher-paid (through tips) 
waiters and waitresses to be somewhat desirous of sharing their greater pay with lower-
compensated coworkers in order to retain the benefit of receiving greater pay than their 
coworkers.    And  one  would  expect  the  lower-paid  workers  to  accept  this  transfer  in 
103 See Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 323 (2001).  
104 Id. at 342.
105 Id. at 355 (footnotes omitted).
106 Id. at 357.
107 Id. at 359 (footnote omitted).
108 Id. at 360 (footnotes omitted).
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exchange  for  their  lower-paid  status.    Tip  pooling  provides  a  method  by  which  this 
transfer can be achieved.
A fourth reason that may lead to a greater incidence of voluntary tip pooling than 
our background presumptions might suggest is the fact that our depiction of waiters and 
waitresses as independent competitors is likely to be accurate in relatively few settings.  
Many waiters and waitresses may see themselves not as competitors but allies.  To that 
extent, the assumption that tip pooling will occur only where waiters and waitresses see it 
to be in their individual self-interest is overstated.  
Having  sketched  some  likely  characteristics  of  and  predictions  about  waitstaff 
governance, we turn to the question of what factors may make it more or less likely that 
waitstaff will in fact engage in voluntary tip pooling.  Though the decision will doubtless 
turn  on  the  specifics  on  each  particular  restaurant  setting,  we  offer  the  following 
speculations as to how particular factors might influence the choice.
First, if tips constitute a comparatively larger portion of waitstaff’s take-home 
wages, it would seem less likely that waitstaff would cooperate explicitly and integrate 
horizontally.  
If the size of tips is rather variable, we would expect the extent of cooperation to 
turn  upon  the  reasons  for  that  variation.    If  some  waiters  and  waitresses  garner 
predictably higher tips on a regular basis, then we would expect less cooperation; if, 
however, tips vary unpredictably or based upon factors outside waitstaff’s control, then 
one’s enthusiasm for relative lack of cooperation would translate into one’s aversion to 
gambling.  Because people may not be risk averse where the possible gains are large, we 
might expect waitstaff generally to oppose cooperation here.  On the other hand, people 
might be more risk averse with respect to their wages, so that cooperation could be more 
likely.
A word is appropriate on the decision as to whether or not to include support staff 
in tip pooling.  Our approach suggests that restaurant support staff will potentially enjoy 
tip-pooling under the two extreme cases—where waitstaff cooperate explicitly they may 
opt to pool tips with support staff,
109 and support staff will enjoy tip-pooling where the 
waitstaff choose to form competing “teams”.  In other words, the potentiality for support 
staff to enjoy tip pooling is not correlated to cooperation among the waitstaff: Support 
staff  will  enjoy  tip  pooling  where  there  is  comparatively  little  cooperation  among 
waitstaff, and support staff may enjoy tip-pooling where there is explicit cooperation.  
But  the  intervening  degrees  of  waitstaff  cooperation  will  not  yield  tip  pooling  with 
support staff.  On this account, then, tip pooling among support staff under this scenario 
is a function not of cooperation between waitstaff and support staff but rather a function 
of non-cooperation among waitstaff.
109 If there is horizontal integration, we would expect tip pooling with support staff if it is perceived that 
better  service  will  lead  to  higher  tips  overall.    Cf.  Kaldor-Hicks  efficiency  (defining  an  efficiency 
improvement in terms of overall utility, with the possibility—but not necessarily the reality—of winners 
compensating losers such that everyone would be better off).   [check]
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ii. Mandatory Tip Pooling
As we noted above, federal law and the law of many (if not most) states authorize 
restaurant  management  to  impose  at  least  some  degree  of  tip  pooling  on  restaurant 
workers.    In  this  Section,  we  explore  the circumstances  under  which  management  is 
likely to exercise that authority.
One  California  intermediate  appellate  court  has  offered  a  spirited  defense  of 
employer-mandated  tip  pooling.    The  California  court  of  appeal  in  Leighton  v.  Old 
Heidelberg, Ltd. asserted:
An established tip pooling policy encourages employees to give the best possible 
service. In turn, such service can only enhance the reputation of the restaurant and 
increase business. To permit a waitress to determine what if anything she should 
share with the busboy based upon what she deems to be the worth of his service 
can  only  lead  to  the  surrender  of  the  employer’s  prerogative  to  run  his  own 
business,  dissension  among  employees,  friction  and  quarreling,  loss  of  good 
employees who cannot work in such an environment and a disruption in the kind 
of service the public has a right to expect. An employer must be able to exercise 
control over his business to ensure an equitable sharing of gratuities in order to 
promote peace and harmony among employees and provide good service to the 
public. To deprive a restaurateur of the ability to regulate and control the conduct 
of his own business, leaves the door open to anarchy in the restaurant industry. It 
is for this very reason that employer mandated tip pooling among employees has 
been a long- standing practice establishing a policy in the industry which permits 
the  employer  to  operate  a  well  run,  well  ordered  restaurant  business.  Such  a 
practice serves everyone well—the public, the employees and the employer.
110
We disagree with the court’s assertion that tip pooling is always preferable, or 
even that it always will be undertaken.  But the court is correct to identify different 
factors that may influence management’s decision whether to impose tip pooling (even if 
the court conflates the factors and draws absolute conclusions): Concerns of efficiency 
and  management’s  ultimate  prerogative  to  manage  its  business  will  influence  the 
decision.
At the outset, we assume, as in the previous Section, that economic self-interest 
dominates.  Accordingly, we assume that management is concerned in some way with 
maximizing  restaurant  profits.
111    That  means  that  management  will  implement  tip 
pooling where such an arrangement will lead to an increase in restaurant profits. 
110 269 Cal. Rptr. 647, 653 (Ct. App. 2d Dist. 1990).
111 If management and ownership are identical, then the incentive is clear.  If management is distinct from 
ownership, then presumably ownership will reward management for increases in profits, and thus profit-
maximization is incentivized.  
http://law.bepress.com/alea/14th/art54Law and Economics of Tipping 23
The  time  horizon  over  which  profits  are  to  be  maximized  and  the  type  of 
restaurant will affect the decision management makes.  For example, management may 
simply want to maximize customer turnover so as to increase short-term profits.  In that 
case, management’s choice as to tip pooling will turn on whether the resulting service 
structure is more or less geared to quick customer turnover.
112
Management may also be concerned with the perceived quality of service, insofar 
as  they  affects  repeat  business,  and  profits  over  the  longer  term.    Management  may 
conclude that service is kinder and friendlier in a setting where servers get along well, 
and  may  determine  that  tip  pooling  fosters  that  goal.    Certainly,  in  cases  where 
destructive competitive tipping is interfering with proper service, management may find 
it especially appropriate to impose tip pooling.
Management also may be concerned with maximizing profits by minimizing cash 
salary payments to staff.  Recall that tips can be used to offset the cash minimum wage 
that management must pay to workers.  Thus, if a restaurant pays more of its workers at 
below the generally applicable minimum wage, it may invoke tip pooling as a means of 
distributing tips over a greater set of employees.
Management’s business plan may also rely on retaining employees over the long 
term.  One aspect of that strategy might be a focus on increasing the attractiveness of 
lower-tier positions.  Thus, for example, one might expect to see management implement 
mandatory tip pooling where the restaurant tends to promote from within, i.e., to promote 
busstaff to waitstaff positions.
113
As in the case of voluntary tip pooling, sometimes concerns that are not strictly 
economic might influence management’s decision as to mandatory tip pooling.  As the 
California court of appeal suggested, management might be inclined to invoke tip pooling 
where management wants—and thinks it’s entitled—to flex managerial muscle.
114  On 
the  other  hand,  management  might  be  less  inclined  to  implement  tip  pooling  where 
waiters  tend  to  stay  around  for  a  long  while,  and  thus  have  developed  a  sense  of 
autonomy; this is even more likely to be the case where mandatory tip pooling has yet to 
be employed, so that individual waiters and waitresses may have developed a sense of 
entitlement to the actual tips that they each receive.
115
112 The question of whether tip pooling—and what scope of tip pooling—best serves the goal of customer 
turnover  is  an  empirical  one.    Perhaps  competition  among  serving  staff  speeds  up  service  (indeed, 
management might capitalize on competition by, for example, rewarding productive waiters and waitresses 
with shifts covering the “best tables” in the restaurant); on the other hand, perhaps cooperation does.
113 Cf. Day, supra note 8 (“Restaurant companies, which are competing against one another to attract and 
retain  workers,  are  offering  incentives  like  job  training  and  the  prospect  of  promotion  to 
management . . . .”); supra [check] (discussing Frank and Sunstein).
114 See supra [check].
115 Cf. endowment effect [check] [supra note [check]/ Sunstein]; Sunstein, supra note [check], at 229-30 
(noting that perceptions of fairness are important to workers, and that people, including workers, sometimes 
think that the law is what they think it should be).
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IV. Conclusion
[TO COME]
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